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ARBITRABILITY OR DELEGATION: A COMMENT ON SEIU LOCAL 121RN V. LOS ROBLES
REG'L MED. CTR.
By
Tim Mangan*

I. INTRODUCTION
In SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a court, not the arbitrator, will decide the issue of arbitrability if the
arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) is silent or unclear
on who is to make the arbitrability determination.1 The decision in Los Robles overturned
nearly a quarter century of precedent on whether courts or arbitrators decide questions of
arbitrability in collective bargaining cases in the Ninth Circuit.2
In 1995, the Supreme Court held in First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, that
questions of arbitrability in disputes where the arbitration provision is silent on the issue
is to be decided by courts.3 Soon afterwards, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780 v. Desert Palace held that
the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options only applied to commercial disputes.4 The
Ninth Circuit held in Desert Palace that arbitrability disputes in collective bargaining
cases would be decided by the arbitrator.5 In 2010, the Supreme Court clarified its First
Options decision in Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters. Granite Rock held that
there is no difference in the resolution of questions of arbitrability in commercial and
collective bargaining disputes.6 Ten years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Granite
Rock, the Ninth Circuit was given an opportunity to clarify its’ holding from Desert
Palace. In a two to one decision, Los Robles simplified the rule over which party answers
questions of arbitrability if the arbitration provision is silent on the issue in the Ninth
Circuit: the courts.7

* Tim Mangan is the Editor-in-Chief of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2022 Juris Doctor Candidate at
The Pennsylvania State University Law School.
1. SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., 976 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2020).
2. Id.
3. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
4. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780 v. Desert Palace, 94 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.
1996).
5. Id.
6. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
7. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 849.
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II. CASE BACKGROUND
In 2014, Los Robles Regional Medical Center (the “Hospital”) entered into a
CBA with the Service Employees International Union Local 121RN (“SEIU”).8 The
SEIU is a union that represents registered nurses who work at the Hospital.9 The CBA
was a three year contract beginning on September 16, 2014; the CBA created the terms
and conditions for the registered nurses’ employment at the Hospital.10 These terms and
conditions formalized the amount of hours that nurses were to work each week, as well as
the number of and type of patients that the nurses were to care for.11 The issues in this
case arose from the interpretation of Article 38 of the CBA.12 Article 38 provided
grievance procedures between the Hospital and the SEIU, with the final step being
arbitration.13 Article 38 defined “grievance” as, "a dispute or disagreement involving the
interpretation, application or compliance with specific provisions of this Agreement
(including Article and Section) or a dispute or disagreement concerning whether or not
discipline including discharge was for just cause.”14 Article 38 stated that if a grievance
reached the arbitration stage in the grievance procedures, the arbitrator was not allowed
to “modify the terms of the CBA.”15
In September 2017, one week before the CBA expired, the SEIU filed a grievance
against the Hospital claiming that the Hospital assigned certain patients to nurses despite
knowing that those nurses did not have the training to care for those patients.16 The SEIU
also asserted that the Hospital violated nurse-to-patient ratios that were set and mandated
by California state law.17 The SEIU claimed that these practices violated three sections of
8. Id. at 850.
9. Id. at 851.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 851.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852 (Meaning that nurses in California were only allowed to care for a
certain number of patients during their shifts. The number of patients that a nurse could care for a shift varied
based on the unit or department that nurse was assigned to.).
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the CBA including the Articles on “Safety” and “Job Descriptions,” as well as California
state and federal laws.18 Two months later, after failed attempts to resolve the grievances
between the Hospital and the SEIU, the SEIU notified the Hospital that it was planning
on pursing arbitration to resolve the grievances.19 The Hospital claimed that the
grievances stemmed from an issue covered by the staffing provision of Article 25 and
therefore was not arbitrable.20 The Hospital neatly summarized the dispute in an email
sent to the SEIU: "confirm[ing] we continue to disagree that this matter is substantively
arbitrable AND disagree that an arbitrator has the authority to decide that issue."21
In May 2018, the SEIU filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was granted
by the district court on January 15, 2019.22 The district court identified two major
questions raised by the motion.23 The first question was whether the parties were bound
by the arbitration provision of the CBA.24 The court determined there was no argument
about the validity of the first question, so it moved to the second and crucial question.25
The second question was whether the grievance fell within the scope of the arbitration
provision within the CBA.26
The district court then began its analysis on whether the grievance fell within the
scope of the arbitration provision of the CBA.27 To make that decision, the district court
first determined that it would need to decide if the arbitration agreement in the CBA gave
the arbitrator or a court the authority to decide who had jurisdiction.28 The district court
analyzed the precedent related to this issue mainly through two cases: United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780 v. Desert Palace from the Ninth Circuit
and Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters from the Supreme Court.29 The district
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 852.
22. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also United Bhd.of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780 v. Desert Palace, 94 F.3d 1308
(9th Cir. 1996); Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
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court reasoned that the basis of the decision in Desert Palace was overturned by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Granite Rock, but it could not overturn Desert Palace
because Desert Palace was still controlling for district courts in the Ninth Circuit. The
district court explained that the appellate court would need to overturn Desert Palace
because the district court did not have the authority to do so.30 Therefore, the district
court found that the arbitration provision in the CBA was broad enough to allow the
arbitrator the ability to determine if the grievance was arbitrable.31 Following this
decision, the Hospital appealed to the Ninth Circuit.32
III. APPELLATE COURT ANALYSIS AND DISSENT
The Ninth Circuit began its review of the district court’s decision de novo.33 The
Ninth Circuit decided that the case implicated three types of arbitral disputes:
(“1) the Merits Question—a dispute between the parties regarding
the merits of an issue (e.g., whether the Hospital's conduct, as set
out in the grievance, violates the CBA); (2) the Arbitrability
Question—a dispute regarding whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate the Merits Question (e.g., whether the arbitration
provision in the CBA requires the Hospital and SEIU to arbitrate
the grievance); and (3) the Delegation Question—a dispute
regarding whether an arbitrator or a court is tasked with deciding
the Arbitrability Question.”34
The Ninth Circuit first decided that the first two questions, the Merits Question
and the Arbitrability Question were not in debate in this case, so those questions were not
analyzed.35 The Ninth Circuit explained that the resolution of the most important
question, the Delegation Question, depended on the analysis of three cases: First
Options, the Supreme Court decision from 1995, the Ninth Circuit’s 1996 decision in
Desert Palace, and the Supreme Court decision from 2010, Granite Rock36

30. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852.
36. Id.
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First, the Ninth Circuit discussed the decision in First Options.37 The Ninth
Circuit stated that in First Options, the Supreme Court held that courts were the proper
entity to answer who determines if an agreement is arbitrable when the parties "did not
clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration.”38 The Supreme Court
held that a court “should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless
there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.”39
Next, the Ninth Circuit discussed its own decision from 1996 in Desert Palace.40
The court in Desert Palace began its opinion by explaining that courts should decide
arbitrability in cases where there is debate over whether an arbitrator or a court should
decide questions of arbitrability.41 Later in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, however, the
court began to cite earlier cases than First Options and ultimately came to the conclusion
that in labor situations, the arbitrator should decide arbitrability, not the courts.42 The
court in Desert Palace distinguished the Desert Palace case from the decision in First
Options by claiming that the decision in First Options was a dispute in commercial
arbitration, while the dispute in Desert Palace was a labor or collective bargaining
dispute.43 The Ninth Circuit in Desert Palace argued that “parties entering into
a collective bargaining agreement know they are granting the arbitrator tremendous
power . . . ”44 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the decision in First Options was not
binding for collective bargaining disputes and ruled that the arbitrator had the power to
decide questions of arbitrability.45
The Ninth Circuit then argued that the Supreme Court seemingly clarified
arbitrability questions for both commercial and collective bargaining disputes in Granite

37. Id.
38. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995) ; SEIU Local 121RN., 976
F.3d at 853.
39. See First Options of Chi., Inc., 514 U.S. at 947; SEIU Local 121RN., 976 F.3d at 853.
40. SEIU Local 121RN., 976 F.3d at 853; United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780, 94
F.3d at 1310.
41. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 853; United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780, 94
F.3d at 1310.
42. SEIU Local 121RN., 976 F.3d at 853; United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780, 94
F.3d at 1310-11.
43. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 853; United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780, 94
F.3d at 1311.
44. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 853; United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 1780, 94
F.3d at 1310.
45. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 853.

5

Rock.46 The court stated that Granite Rock was a dispute over a collective bargaining
agreement between an employer and a labor union over when its CBA was ratified and if
the court or an arbitrator had the ability to answer that question.47 The Court explained in
its opinion that a court should determine the question of arbitrability; it took the holding
from First Options and applied it to both commercial and collective bargaining
disputes.48 The Supreme Court clarified multiple times in its analysis that arbitrability
should be decided by courts in both commercial and collective bargaining disputes.49
Here, the Ninth Circuit then applied its analysis by implementing the Supreme
Court’s previous holdings and applying them to the facts of the dispute between the
Hospital and the SEIU. The Ninth Circuit clearly stated that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Granite Rock, on applying the same arbitrability framework to both
commercial and collective bargaining disputes, “is clearly irreconcilable with the reasons
that this court in Desert Palace relied on to distinguish First Options.”50 The Ninth
Circuit then began to analyze if Desert Palace is still good law in the Ninth Circuit.51 The
SEIU argued that Granite Rock answered a different question than the question addressed
in Desert Palace.52 SEIU contended that Desert Palace answered the Delegation
Question while the Supreme Court’s decision in Granite Rock answered the Arbitrability
Question, so Granite Rock should not overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Desert
Palace.53 The court explained that the SEIU’s argument was not persuasive because the
issue decided from the higher court does not need to be “identical in order to
be controlling" over a prior circuit decision; rather, the Supreme Court "must have
undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that
the cases are clearly irreconcilable."54
The Ninth Circuit opined in Los Robles that even though the Supreme Court in
Granite Rock answered the Arbitrability Question, and not the Delegation Question that
was answered in Desert Palace, the cases at their core were answering the same

46. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 854.; Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 130 S.
Ct. 2847 (2010).
47. Id.
48. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 854; Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 297.
49. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 854; Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 301.
50. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 854.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 854-55.
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question.55 The key question answered in both cases “was what did the parties agree to
have the arbitrator decide?”56 Because the Supreme Court answered the same Delegation
Question that was asked in Desert Palace, the Ninth Circuit determined that the decision
in Granite Rock would control the decision here.57
The SEIU also claimed that Desert Palace is distinguishable from First Options
because the courts in those two cases decided different questions of silence in regard to
the Delegation Question.58 The silence in the Delegation Question in First Options was
because there was no arbitration clause in the agreement; the silence in Desert Palace
was in regard to whether an arbitration clause, that was in the contract, covered the
Delegation Question.59 The Ninth Circuit contended that the decision in Desert Palace
was based on the difference between commercial and labor-based arbitration, not the
differences in the type of silence in the Delegation Questions.60 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the difference between First Options and Desert Palace was “that
policy differences justify different application of the arbitrability framework in
commercial versus labor disputes.”61 The Ninth Circuit finished by stating that this was
the exact argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Granite Rock.62
The SEIU then changed its argument by asking the Ninth Circuit to find that its’ postGranite Rock decision in Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emple. v. Insync Show Prods.,
Inc., was indistinguishable from the current facts being litigated.63 There the Ninth
Circuit found that a question over a “broad arbitration clause” was to be decided by the
arbitrator, not the courts.64 The SEIU claimed that if the Ninth Circuit decided that a
court, not an arbitrator, should decide arbitrability, then the Ninth Circuit would
essentially overturn Insync without Supreme Court precedent.65 The SEIU argued that
this case should be governed by the decision in Insync but the Ninth Circuit explained
55. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 857.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 858.
59. Id.
60. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 858.
61. Id. at 857.
62. Id. at 858.
63. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 858; Int'l All. of Theatrical Stage Emp.s v. Insync Show Prods., Inc., 801
F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2015).
64. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 858.
65. Id.
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that Insync was distinguishable from this case because Insync determined the arbitrability
of a termination clause, not the arbitrability of the arbitration requirement itself.66
The Ninth Circuit finally explained “that the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Granite Rock is clearly irreconcilable with Desert Palace, and thus Desert Palace was
abrogated.”67 Because Desert Palace was no longer good law, the court determined that
there was no “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator to
decide arbitrability.68 Because the arbitration clause was silent regarding who should
determine arbitrability, the Ninth Circuit followed precedent from First Options and
Granite Rock and held that the question was subject to judicial determination.69 The case
was then reversed and remanded back to the district court.70
In Judge Lee’s dissent, he explained why he thought that Granite Rock did not
overturn Desert Palace and why the Ninth Circuit’s decision was incorrect.71 Judge Lee
began his argument by acknowledging that Desert Palace was a flawed decision.72 He
argued that Desert Palace’s holding was “that a broad arbitration agreement in the
collective bargaining context reflects ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability—even though the contract is silent on that issue.”73 He
stated that this line is counterintuitive because it is construing silence to be “clear and
unmistakable evidence.”74 Judge Lee further argued that although the basis of the
decision in Desert Palace was rocky, he thought that it should not be overturned because
it addressed a different issue than Granite Rock.75 Judge Lee claimed that Desert Palace
dealt with who decides arbitrability (the Delegation Question) while Granite Rock dealt
with whether a specific issue was arbitrable (the Arbitrability Question).76

66. Id. at 859.
67. Id. at 861.
68. Id.
69. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 861
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 861.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Judge Lee also argued that the Supreme Court in Granite Rock appeared to have
implicitly recognized that its decision does not apply to the Delegation Question.77 Judge
Lee argued this because Granite Rock appears to hold that the courts are required to
compel arbitration if they find that the an arbitration agreement was validly formed and it
covered the question in dispute.78 He inferred that because Granite Rock discussed a
requirement for courts to compel arbitration if they find the arbitration agreement to be
valid, Granite Rock was only referring to the Arbitrability Question.79 Judge Lee thought
that Granite Rock’s decision did not cover the Delegation Question so it did not overturn
Desert Palace meaning that Desert Palace should have controlled here and the question
of arbitrability should be left to the arbitrator not the courts.80
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Los Robles is significant in collective bargaining
arbitration because it overturns a well-established precedent that the arbitrator determines
the question of arbitrability for collective bargaining disputes.81 Los Robles now requires
that courts determine if an arbitrability clause is valid in both commercial and collective
bargaining contexts.82 This is important to labor unions who in the past have used
arbitrators to determine if their disputes are arbitrable.83 If arbitrability disputes are to be
decided by the arbitrator, it is likely that the dispute will stay in arbitration which could
allow for a faster and cheaper resolution for labor unions and their employers.84
Because Los Robles overturns Desert Palace, there is now a foreseeable situation
where labor unions and employers will be required to spend more money than necessary
on determining if issues are arbitrable by going through a court system before going back
to the arbitrator to resolve the actual dispute.85 This inefficiency could make arbitration
less effective overall because parties frequently choose arbitration to stay out of the court
system. This decision, however, requires parties in the Ninth Circuit to go to courts to
77. Id.at 863.
78. Id.
79. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 863.
80. Id.
81. Vin Gurrieri, 9th Circ. Tasks Court Over Arbitrator to Weigh SEIU Grievance, Law360, Sept. 18, 2020,
https://www.law360.com/articles/1311793.
82. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 863.
83. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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determine arbitrability of disputes, when they previously could have the arbitrator
decide.86 Once a court determines that the dispute is arbitrable, the court is required by
Granite Rock to send the case back to arbitration.87
Ultimately, reversing, and remanding Los Robles may not have an effect on the
actual outcome of the grievance.88 It is likely that a court will find that the SEIU’s
argument was persuasive and that the substantive dispute between the Hospital and the
SEIU is arbitrable. The grievance should be covered by three arbitrable articles of the
CBA including the Safety, Job Descriptions and In-Service Education mandates.89 The
terms of the grievance are not explicitly removed from arbitration clause like other
potential grievances such as the Hospital violating the staffing provision.90 The SEIU
dropped the nurse to patient ratio staffing provision complaint because it was clearly not
arbitrable.91 Therefore, the only substantive issue, the training dispute, will likely be
considered arbitrable by the district court and the arbitrator will then decide the outcome
of that question.92
V. CRITIQUE
The decision by the Ninth Circuit in Los Robles clarifies the Ninth Circuit’s
earlier interpretation of First Options from their decision in Desert Palace.93 Los Robles
was a debatable decision because, as Judge Lee stated in the dissent, this case blurred the
lines between the “Delegation Question” from Desert Palace and the “Arbitrability
Question” decided in Granite Rock.94 That viewpoint would indicate that this decision
86. Appellant Los Robles Regional Medical Center's Reply Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l
Med. Ctr, No. 19-55185, 2019 WL 3763928.
87. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836.
88. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836; see also Appellant Los Robles Regional Medical Center's Reply Brief, SEIU
Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr, No. 19-55185, 2019 WL 3763928.
89. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836.
90. Id. at 31.
91. Appellant Los Robles Regional Medical Center's Reply Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l
Med. Ctr, No. 19-55185, 2019 WL 3763928.
92. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836.
93. Vin Gurrieri, 9th Circ. Tasks Court Over Arbitrator to Weigh SEIU Grievance, Law360, Sept. 18, 2020,
https://www.law360.com/articles/1311793.
94. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 849.
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violated a Ninth Circuit decision in FTC v Consumer Def., Ltd. Liab. Co. that stated: "if
we can apply our precedent consistently with that of the higher authority, we must do
so."95 Some, including Judge Lee, would argue that this decision may have been made in
the sake of convenience because Los Robles brought the Ninth Circuit in line with
arbitrability decisions in other circuits.96 Judge Lee made a strong enough case in the
dissent to indicate that Desert Palace did not necessarily need to be overturned based on
Granite Rock.
The majority and potentially other jurisdictions would likely believe that
overturning Desert Palace is a decision that makes sense based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Granite Rock.97 Although Los Robles provides consistency to an inconsistent
answer from the Ninth Circuit, some will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Granite Rock was actually based on policy considerations not contract principles.98 If that
is the case and the Ninth Circuit wanted arbitrators to resolve arbitrability questions in
collective bargaining disputes, then this case would negatively impact the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion on the efficiency of arbitration.99 Collective bargaining disputes feature
sophisticated parties on both sides.100 It is likely that this decision will push determining
questions of arbitrability into the CBA negotiation phase.101 If the contract “clearly and
unmistakably” states that the arbitrator will decide issues of arbitrability then a court
must determine that the arbitrator has the ability to determine questions of arbitrability as
well.102 Proponents of arbitration would argue that even though this decision would be
easy to get around by contracting out who determines arbitrability, it is a waste of time
and resources for the parties. The majority stated that a decision did not need to be
“identical in order to be controlling" over a prior circuit decision.103 In Los Robles, it was
apparent that the facts were not identical to Granite Rock but now a real debate exists
over whether the court took too much of a creative liberty in overturing its own decision
in Desert Palace. Overall, the majority built their decision around the controversial
95. FTC v. Consumer Def., Ltd. Liab. Co., 926 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2019).
96. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836.
97. Appellant Los Robles Regional Medical Center's Reply Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l
Med. Ctr, No. 19-55185, 2019 WL 3763928.
98. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 862.
99. Appellee SEIU Local 121RN’s Answering Brief, SEIU Local 121RN v. Los Robles Reg'l Med. Ctr., No.
19-55185, 2019 WL 2551836.
100. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852.
101. Id.
102. Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 267.
103. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 854.
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differences between the Arbitrability Question and the Delegation Question, resulting in
an unconvincing opinion to the SEIU, Judge Lee and potentially many others.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Los Robles grants discretion to the courts to determine the
arbitrability of disputes in cases where the arbitrability agreement is silent on who should
answer that question.104 This decision simplifies who answers questions of arbitrability in
the Ninth Circuit: the courts will determine disputes over arbitrability unless the
arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably says otherwise.105

104. Id. at 852.
105. SEIU Local 121RN, 976 F.3d at 852; see also Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 267.
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